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GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN THE
COMMON LAW OF DOMICILE
AND THE APPLICATION OF THE

CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS*
By

ANNALISE ACORN*

A married woman must take her husband's domicile at common law.
This rule exists in five of Canada's provinces. It is argued that the rule
violates the right to equality. It is further argued that, notwithstanding
the Supreme Court's decision in Dolphin Delivery, the Chartermust apply
to common law rules governing the relationship between husband and
wife. Such rules impose a status on the parties. Therefore, a
commitment to respect for the autonomous choice of individuals does not
support the conclusion that the rules should be beyond constitutional
review.
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L INTRODUCT[ON
Under the common law rules of domicile, a married woman

has no legal capacity to have a domicile separate from that of her
husband
Thus, a woman takes her husband's domicile upon
marriage and retains it, whether or not she lives with her husband,
and whether or not she has any independent connection with her
husband's domicile? Although the rule has been eroded by
legislative reform,3 it still operates to define the domicile of married
women in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland,
4
Saskatchewan, and Alberta.
The concept of domicile figures prominently in the area of

conflict of laws. Where an international element exists, it is often
resolved by reference to the connecting factor of domicile.- Thus,
jurisdiction in nullity is taken on the basis of the domicile of the
parties. 6 Succession to movable property is governed by the law of
1

A.G. Alberta v. Cook, [1926] A.C. 444 (P.C.) [hereinafter Cook].

2 Lord Advocate v. Jaffrey (1920), [1921] 1 A-C. 146 (H.L.) [hereinafter Jaffey].
3 For a detailed discussion of statutory reform in the area, see below, section III.
4 At the federal level, the concept of domicile no longer has great practical significance.
However, even there, the rule of domicile of dependence has not been completely repealed.
See below, section III.
5 J.G. McLeod, The Conflict ofLaws (Calgary: Carswell, 1983) c. 8, part II; J.-G. Castel,
Canadian Conflict of Laws, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1986) c. 3; J.H.C. Morris, The
Conflict of Laws, 3d ed. (London: Stevens and Sons, 1984) c. 2.
6 Re Capon, [1965] 2 O.R. 83, 49 D.LR. (2d) 675 (CA.); Solomon v. Walters (1956),
18 W.W.R. 257 (B.C.S.C.); Fleming v. Fleming, [1934] O.R. 588, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 90 (S.C.);
Stuart v. Stuart (1983), 34 R.F.L (2d) 104 (Ont. S.C.) [hereinafter Stuart]; Davies v. Davies
(1985), 40 Alta LR. (2d) 203 (Q.B.) [hereinafter Davies]. Note, however, that domicile is not
the only basis for taking jurisdiction in nullity. The dual residence of the parties or the
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also the
the domicile of the testatrix.7 In the past, domicile was
8

determinative factor in relation to jurisdiction in divorce.
The purpose of this article is to examine the history of the
concept of the domicile of dependence of married women and to
identify the extent to which a married woman is still under an
incapacity to acquire a domicile independent from that of her
husband under Canadian law. From there, I shall go on to argue
that the rule violates the equality provisions of the CanadianCharter
of Rights and Freedoms9 and that it cannot be justified as a
reasonable limit on the right to equality guaranteed by section 15 of
the Charter.
A difficulty arises, however, in relation to the application of
the Charter to this common law rule. In R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin
Delivery," the Supreme Court of Canada decided that the common
law, in so far as it relates to the relationships between individuals
rather than the relationship between the individual and the state, is
not subject to Charter scrutiny 1 Thus, it was decided that section
2(b) of the Charter guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression
did not apply to the question of whether the court could grant an
injunction restraining picketing on the basis of the common law tort
of inducement to breach of contract.

residence of the respondent have been recognized as a basis for taking jurisdiction.

See

Ramsay-Fairfaxv. Ramsay-Fairfax (1955), [1956] P. 115, [1955] 3 All E.R. 695 (CA.). But
this is no consolation to the woman petitioning for a decree of nullity in the jurisdiction in
which she is resident and de facto domiciled, if the husband respondent is not also resident
there. Jurisdiction has also been taken on the basis of the wife's independent domicile or the
place of the marriage, but only where the marriage is void, not voidable. Ross Smith v. Ross
Smith (1962), [1963] A.C. 280, [1962] 1 All E.R. 344 (H.L); De Renevile v. De Reneville
(1947), [1948] P. 100, [1948] 1 All E.R. 56 (C.A.) [hereinafter De Reneville].

7 Castel, supra, note 5 at 462 n. 8; McLeod, supra, note 5 at 413-14, 416-32.
8 LeMesmrier v. LeMesurier, [1895] A C. 517 (P.C.) [hereinafter LeMesuier]. For further
detail on the extent to which domicile is used as the connecting factor in the conflict of laws,
seg below, section IV.
9 Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
10 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 33 D.LR. (4th) 174 [hereinafter Dolphin Delivery cited to S.C.R].

11 Ibid. at 599.
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The reasoning behind the decision was that this aspect of the
common law dealt with private relations and did not involve
sufficient government participation to activate the application of the
Charter.12 The decision is troublesome in a myriad of ways. It
raises, however, a particularly interesting difficulty in the context of
a Charter challenge to the gender discrimination embedded within
the common law rules relating to domicile of married women.1 3 The
question here is whether the courts would view the rules relating to
domicile as part of the private law and, therefore, immune from
Charter scrutiny.
I shall argue that this kind of common law rule cannot be
considered to be part of the private realm of relations between
individuals.14 The state is deeply involved in the legal construction
of the marital relationship. It would be pure fiction to take the
view that the common law rules denying full legal status to married
women constitute a neutral legal framework which facilitates the
autonomous construction of relationships between private parties.
The state's interest and involvement in legally constituting the
marital relationship is extensive. In creating rules which give lesser

12 Section 32 of the Charter states that the Charter applies to the provincial and federal
legislative bodies and their respective "governments." The word "government" was interpreted
by the Supreme Court as referring to executive and administrative branches of the federal and
provincial governments. /bid at 598.
13 For a critical comment on the Dolphin Delivery decision, see R. Howse, "Dolphin
Deivery: The Supreme Court and the Public/Private Distinction in Canadian Constitutional
Law" (1988) 46 U.T. Fac. L Rev. 248; P. Hogg, "The Dolphin Delivery Case: The Application
of the Charter to Private Action" (1986-87) 51 Sask. L. Rev. 273; J.A. Manwaring, "Bringing
the Common Law to the Bar of Justice: A Comment on the Decision in the Case of Dolphin
Delivery Ltd" (1987) 19 Ottawa L. Rev. 413; G. Otis, "The Charter, Private Action and the
Supreme Court" (1987) 19 Ottawa L.Rev. 71; B. Slattery, "The Charter'sRelevance to Private
Litigation: Does Dolphin Deliver?" (1986-87) 32 McGill L.J. 905; G.P. Crann, "How Far
Does the Charter Reach? A Theoretical Review of the Section 32(1) Debate and Canada's
Emerging 'Governmental Action' Doctrine" (1988-89) 47 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 156; A C.
Hutchinson & AJ. Petter, "Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the Charter"
(1988) 38 U.T.L.J. 278.
14 For an interesting discussion of the extent to which the state is involved in shaping
the institution of the family and the difficulties of applying the public/private distinction in the
family law context, see F. Olsen, 'The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform" (1983) 96 Harm. L.Rev. 1497; F. Olsen, '"he Politics of Family Law" (1984) 2 Law
and Inequality 1. See also M.J. Mossman & M. MacLean, "Family Law and Social Welfare:
Toward a New Equality" (1986) 5 Can. J. Fain. L.79.
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status to women in marriage, the state is controlling and shaping the
unequal character of the relationship between husbands and wives.
Thus, the state is imposing through law a subordinate position on
women in marriage. If the Charter,which guarantees equality before
and under the law without discrimination on the basis of sex, is not
legally effective in preventing even this most blatant kind of gender
discrimination, then the protection against discrimination that it
purports to afford is illusory.
Many advocates of gender equality have been sceptical about
the efficacy of the Charter to further the aims of the Women's
Movement 5 This scepticism generally arises out of a prediction
that, although the Charter may be a useful tool in achieving formal
gender equality, it will not be useful in eradicating the inequalities
which arise out of the historically subordinated role that has been
imposed upon women at a social and economic level. Formal legal
equality will not cure the evil of the exclusion of women from full
participation in the society; nor will it eradicate the psychological
stronghold of the celebration of male dominance that is pervasive
throughout 16our own culture and those cultures from which we draw
historically.
However, the picture of the efficacy of the Charter may be
even bleaker than these commentators suggest. When we look at
the possible impact of the decision in Dolphin Delivery on the
courts' approach to the gender inequalities embedded within the
common law of husband and wife, we may have to take an even
more pessimistic view of the power of the Charterto eradicate even
15 See G. Brodsky & S. Day, Canadian CharterEquality Rights for Women: One Step
Forwardor Two Steps Back? (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women,

1989); K.A.Lahey, 'The Canadian Charter of Rights and Pornography: Toward a Theory of
Actual Gender Equality' (1984-85) 20 N. Eng. L. Rev. 649; C. MacKinnon, "Making Sex
Equality Real" in L Smith, G. Cotd-Harper & R. Elliot, eds, Righting the Balance: Canada's
New Equality Rights (Saskatoon: Canadian Human Rights Reporter, 1986). For a discussion
of the limitations of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment in the United States, see C.
MacKinnon, "Not by Law Alone: From a Debate with Phyllis Schlafly" in Feminism
Unmodified (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987) 28.

16 See I. Savage, "Systemic Discrimination and Section 15 of the Charter"(1985-86) 50
Sask. L Rev. 141; N.C. Sheppard, 'Equality, Ideology and Oppression: Women and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' (1986) 10:2 Dalhousie LJ. 195; C. Boyle & S.
Noonan, "Prostitution and Pornography: Beyond Formal Equality" (1986) 10:2 Dalhousie LJ.

225.

424

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 29 No. 3

the legal enforcement of dominance of men over women. Perhaps
we will find that even formal equality of legal status for women is
not guaranteed by the most robust of our human rights protections.
II. HISTORY OF THE DOMICILE OF MARRIED WOMEN
A. The Rule and Its Rhetoric
There are few judicial expositions of the reasoning behind
the rule that a married woman suffers a legal incapacity to acquire
her own domicile. Indeed, some courts have expressly refused to
comment upon the rationale behind the rule,1 7 though their fidelity
to it has been unwavering.1 8 In Jaffrey,19 the House of Lords was
concerned with the law applicable to the matter of succession to the
movable property of a married woman.20 The common law choice
of law rule for succession to movable property is that it is governed
by the law of the domicile of the testator or the testatrix at the time
of his or her death. 21 Thus, the court was faced with the task of
determining the domicile of the deceased testatrx Isabella
Mackinnon.
In 1878, she was married to Robert MacKinnon. The two
lived together in Scotland for fifteen years. In 1886, Robert
Mackinnon retired from his position in the navy and thereafter
began drinking heavily and acquired "dissipated habits." In 1893,
Isabella Mackinnon was no longer able to tolerate her husband's
dissolute life style. Arrangements were made for him to leave
Scotland to go and live in Australia. Isabella's mother paid the

17 See infra, note 26 and accompanying text.
18 An exception to the usual judicial adherence to the rule is found in the one page
decision of McDonald 3. of the Alberta Queen's Bench in Davies, supra, note 6. See also
the accompanying annotation by N. Rafferty at 203.
19 Supra, note 2.
20 S
nid.
21 See supra, note 7.
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expenses of his relocation.2 2 By 1902, he had settled in Brisbane,
Queensland and had entered into a bigamous marriage there.
Isabella Mackinnon and Robert Mackinnon never spoke or
communicated after his departure from Scotland in 1893. Isabella
Mackinnon lived alone in Scotland for twenty-two years after his
departure. She never went to Australia. She never saw Queensland. She died in Aberdeen in 1915.
The House of Lords was unanimous in its decision that she
had died domiciled in Queensland. The twenty-two year separation
coupled with the husband's bigamous marriage did not have the
result of empowering Isabella Mackinnon to acquire a domicile of
her own in Scotland where she had lived all her life. Once it was
decided that Robert Mackinnon had acquired a new domicile of
choice in Queensland, that domicile was automatically transmitted to
her.
In holding that Isabella MacKinnon was domiciled in
Queensland, the House of Lords did not directly discuss the policy
reasons behind the rule that the wife's domicile remains the same as
that of her husband irrespective of the true home of the wife.
There is, however, some suggestion in the court's reasoning that the
rule arises as a result of a wife's duty to live with her husband.23
The court points out, however, that the existence of a set of
circumstances sufficient to allow a court to absolve the wife of her
obligation to live with her husband through the granting of a judicial
separation does not, in absence of the actual order of the court,
empower the woman to have her own domicile.2 4 Thus, the
underlying rationale behind the rule, as evidenced by the opinion of
the court in Jaffrey, is that because a wife has a duty to live with
her husband, the law will assume that she does live with her
husband.25 If for whatever reason she does not, the punishment for
22

Jaffrey, supra, note 2 at 147.

23 bid at 156.
24 Ibid at 155, 158-59. Note that the House of Lords allowed for the possibility that
a woman with a judicial separation could establish her own domicile. Ibid at 160. This
possiblity was extinguished by the decision in Cook, supra, note 1.

25 Note, however, that Viscount Cave was of the view that the domicile of dependence
arose, not only out of the duty to live with the husband, but also as a "consequence of the
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failure in her duty will at least be that she retains a legal incapacity
to establish her own domicile elsewhere. The fact that the
separation is not her fault will not be sufficient to free her of the
incapacities of marriage.
In Jaffrey, while suggestions for adopting this sort of
conceptual foundation for the rule exist, the general tenor of the
judgment is one of deference to established principle and humble
reluctance to question it. Viscount Finlay, in defending the decision
that Isabella Mackinnon was domiciled in Queensland, stated:
As to the existence of the rule, there is no doubt. It would be at once undesirable

and mischievous to enter into an examination of the reasons on which the rule was
based, and, if it should appear on inquiry after the death of one or both of the
parties that these reasons might not aygly in any particular case, to say that the
rule should be treated as inapplicable.

Thus, the court adopted a formalistic approach to the
application of the rule.27 Perhaps hesitant to become too articulate
about the subordination of women enforced by' the rule, the court
took up the pose of hands tied by precedent.
In Warrender v. Warrender,29 the husband and wife had
agreed to separate. The wife was born in England and spent most
of her life there. The husband was domiciled in Scotland. The wife
spent a few short periods of time in Scotland prior to the
separation, but resided in England for the most part, even during
the currency of the marriage. In deciding that the wife was
domiciled in Scotland, the Court again seems to be relying on a
wife's duty to live with the husband. Lord Brougham stated:
Nay, had the parties lived in different places, from a mutual understanding which
prevailed between them, the case would still be the same. The law could take no

union between husband and wife brought about by the marriage tie." See Jaffrey, supra, note
2 at 158.
26

Ibid. at 157.

27 For a discussion of the meaning of formalism, see F. Schauer, "Formalism" (1988) 97
Yale Li. 509.
28 As I shall illustrate, however, the severity of the rule and the inflexibility of the courts'

application of it increased dramatically in the first half of the twentieth century. See below,
section II.B.
29 (1835) II Clark & Finnelly 488, 6 E.R. 1239 (H.L.) [hereinafter Warrender].
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notice of the fact, but must proceed upon its own conclusive presumption and hold

her domiciled where she ought3to0 be, and where, in all ordinary circumstances, she
would be, - with her husband.

Again, we see the recurring theme that the wife will be seen by the
law to be domiciled where she has a duty to be domiciled and not
where she in fact is domiciled.
Text writers have on occasion ventured more eloquent
expositions of the reasons supporting the doctrine. In 1901, Raleigh
C. Minor, in his text on the conflict of laws, wrote:
It is a general principle of the common law, and one that is more or less inherent
in all systems of jurisprudence, that a married woman merges her legal identity in

her husband's, and solemnly yields her will to his. Hence, it results that the
husband is bound to support her, has the control of her person, and is entitled to
her services ... From this principle follows the general rule of law which fixes her

domicil. It is established beyond dispute that a woman, upon marriage, immediately
acquires the domicil of her husband, and that her domicil ordinarily changes with

every alteration of his, regardless of the actual locality of her residence after the
marriage ... This rule is founded ... on the above mentioned principle of identity and

upon the duty she owes to submit her will to her husband's.3/

The rhetoric of the rule, then, is primarily informed by the
idea that the identity of the woman in marriage is subsumed under
the identity of the man.3 2 The rule is also a symbolic reminder of
the woman's duty to submit to the man and her subordinate position
in relation to him.
B. Developments in the Early Twentieth Century:
Making the Rule More Severe
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the rule fixing
the domicile of dependence of married women was more flexible
than it is now. These early formulations of the rule sometimes
included an admission that, in a case where the actual situation of
the parties was such that they were domiciled in different
30 Ibid. at 524 (emphasis added).
31 R.C. Minor, Conflict of Laws, or, PrivateInternationalLaw (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1901) at 94-95.
32 See also W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1765) at 423-33.
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jurisdictions, the woman could have an independent domicile.33
Thus, the notion that a married woman is absolutely incapable in
law of having her own separate domicile is the judicial invention of
this century.
In Chaisson v. Chaisson,3 4 the husband and wife initially
lived in Prince Edward Island. After repeated acts of cruelty by the
husband against the wife, the two separated. The husband went to
New Brunswick and the wife went to Nova Scotia. The wife later
petitioned for divorce in Nova Scotia and the husband was properly
served with notice of the proceedings in New Brunswick. The Nova
Scotia court took jurisdiction and granted the divorce, holding that
the wife had acquired a domicile in Nova Scotia separate from that
of her husband.
The court expressed some doubt about the legal foundation
of their decision, but cited Stevens v. Fisk 5 as authority for the view
that a woman could have a domicile of her own for the purposes of
grounding jurisdiction for divorce. There, the Supreme Court of
Canada had recognized a foreign decree of divorce granted in New
York, where the New York Supreme Court had taken jurisdiction
on the basis of the wife's independent domicile there. At the time
that the New York Court took jurisdiction, the husband was
domiciled in Quebec. The Court seemed to base its decision on the
finding that under the law of New York a married woman had her
own separate domicile for the purposes of bringing action against

33 For examples of cases in which married women were seen to have their own
independent domicile, see Chaisson v. Chaisson (1920), 53 D.L.R. 361 (N.S. Div. & Matr.
Causes Ct) [hereinafter Chaisson] and Payn v. Payn, [1924] 3 W.W.R. 111 (Alta S.C.)
[hereinafter Payn]. See also Minor, supra, note 31 at 95-103.
34 Chaisson, ibid Note that the case was decided on August 19, 1920, one month after
Jafrey,supra, note 2, which was decided on July 16, 1920. However, even had the Court been
aware of the decision in Jaffrey, there was certainly a basis for distinguishing it since Isabella
Mackinnon's participation in her husband's departure influenced the Court's insistence that
she could not have the right to an independent domicile. By contrast, Mrs. Chaisson was
painted purely as a passive victim of her husband's cruelty.
35 (1885), Cam. S.C. 392.
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her husband.36 The fact that the marriage was contracted in New
York was also relied on in support of the decision.
In Payn v. Payn,37 the Alberta Supreme Court Trial Division
similarily held that a woman deserted by her husband could acquire
her own separate domicile. Thus, the Court proceeded to take
jurisdiction in her petition for divorce, notwithstanding that the
husband was admittedly domiciled in Montana.
The lenience in the application of the rule was soon brought
to an abrupt halt. First, of course, there was the decision in
Jaffrey.38 However, the most ruthless and the most influential case
in the Canadian context was A.G. Alberta v. Cook,39 a decision of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on appeal from the
Supreme Court of Alberta Appellate Division. Reata Cook and her
husband were married in Ontario in 1913. They lived together for
five years. In 1918, they moved to Alberta. Shortly thereafter, the
husband left her and took up an itinerant lifestyle. In 1921, Reata
Cook was able to serve her husband in Alberta with notice of a
petition for a judicial separation. The Alberta Court granted the
order.40
Thereafter, the whereabouts of Mr. Cook became
unknown. In 1922, Reata Cook petitioned the Alberta Court for a
decree of divorce. At trial, her petition was denied for want of
jurisdiction owing to the lack of proof that her husband was
domiciled in Alberta. She appealed the decision to the Alberta
Supreme Court Appellate Division, where the Court accepted
jurisdiction on the basis of her independent domicile.

36 Iid. at 428. It is interesting to note that this is the same basis on which McDonald
J. based his decision in Davies, supra, note 6. The established rule in conflicts of laws is that
the question of domicile is determined under the lec for/. See Re Annesley, [1926] Ch. 692.
Thus, both of these decisions have the same technical flaw, but are rare examples of fancy
judicial footwork done in an attempt to bring about fair treatment of women before the
court.
3

7 Supra, note 33.

38 Supra, note 2.
39 Supra, note 1.
40 The basis for jurisdiction to grant a judicial separation was residence. See Annytage
v. Armytage, [1898] P. 178. Here, the Court found that both parties were at that time resident
in Alberta. See Cook, supra, note 1 at 447.
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In an act of extravagant malevolence, the Attorney-General
for Alberta then intervened on behalf of the erstwhile husband,
launching an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
in England ostensibly because of the "general importance of the
matter."41 The Privy Council declined to follow the more lenient
precedents that had been set in both Canada and England 42 and
held that, even in the event of a judicial separation, the woman
laboured under an incapacity to acquire a domicile independent from
that of her husband.
Indeed, the judgment of the Privy Council left absolutely no
room for any exception to the rule. Unless the marriage was
terminated by death or divorce, the domicile of the wife would be
that of the husband no matter what the actual situation of the
parties was.43 Once it was determined that a judicial separation was
not sufficient to break the wife's incapacity to have, her own
domicile, the notion that the unity of domicile was corollary to the
wife's duty to live with the husband was ousted. Since the judicial
separation dissolved the wife's duty to live with the husband, 44 the
continuation of the woman's incapacity to have a separate domicile
must then have a basis other than that duty. Lord Merrivale
stresses the idea that it is the notion of marital unity, not simply the
wife's obligation to live with the husband, that is the foundation of

41 Cook, supra, note 1 at 448. I have scoured the records of the Attorney-General in
Alberta's provincial archives in an attempt to get some information explaining his conduct.

The only document I found referring to the case at all was a letter on Supreme Court of
Alberta stationary from Frank Ford to the Attorney-General. Ford had represented the
Attorney-General against Cook at the Privy Council and was asking for payment of a balance
of $500.00 still owing on his account. The letter was written on March 14, 1927. Ford had

been appointed to the Alberta Supreme Court Trial Division on May 3, 1926.
42 See supra, note 33. Note also that in 1908 it was suggested by the English Court of
Appeal, in Ogden v. Ogden, [1908] P. 46 at 82, that where the rule of domicile of dependence
operated so as to deny any relief in an action for divorce to a wife actually domiciled in a
country different from her husband, the court should view her as having an independent
domicile. That suggestion was acted upon by the Probate Division in Stathatos v. Stathatos
(1912), [1913] P. 46 and in De Montaigu v. De Montaigu, [1913] P. 154.

43 Cook, supra, note 1 at 459ff.
44 Hyman v. Hyman, [1929] A.C. 601 (H.L.); Everett v. Everett, [1919] P. 298 (CA).
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the rule.45 The effect of this was to close any gap that might have
existed in cases of judicial separation or desertion by the husband,

where the wife could not be seen to be in breach of a duty to live
with the husband. From then on, there is virtually no discussion of

the rationale behind the rule in the cases, but its strict application
prevails.4 6
In cases where the imputing of the husband's domicile to the
wife might result in a civil advantage to the wife, the courts were
less strict in their application of the rule. For example, in
interpreting the Immigration Act of 1952, 47 the courts held that a
married woman could not gain a Canadian domicile for the purposes

of immigration by operation of law. In B. and B. v. Deputy Registrar
General of Vital Statistics,48 the husband had deserted the wife in
Czechoslovakia to come to Alberta. The Court held that the
husband's acquisition of a Canadian domicile did not have the legal
effect of giving the same domicile to the wife. The Court relied

upon the statutory definition of domicile as being contingent upon
being "landed" in Canada as the source of the exception to the

rule.

49

45 Cook, supra, note 1 at 458, 460.

Lord Merrivale quotes from Viscount Cave's

judgment to that effect in Jaffrey, supra, note 2 at 157.
46

Breen v. Breen, [1930] 1 W.W.R. 30 (Man. CA.), decided shortly after Cook, supra,

note 1, does make an attempt to mitigate the effect of the rule, holding that the burden of
proof rests upon the deserter husband to show that he has established a new domicile of
choice elsewhere. Where the husband is not present, the effect is that the husband is held
to be domiciled in the jurisdiction in which he left his wife. Subsequent courts, however, did
not take up this olive branch. The following are cases in which a deserted wife was held to
be domiciled in the jurisdiction in which the husband had relocated: Nelson v. Nelson (1929),
[1930] 3 D.LR. 522 (Sask. CA.) [hereinafter Nelson]; Harrisv. Harris, [1930] 4 D.L.R. 736
at 737 (Sask. CA.), where the husband had both deserted and entered into a bigamous
marriage; Jolly v. Jolly, [1940] 2 D.LR. 759 (B.C.C.A.); Joyce v. Joyce, [1943] 3 W.W.R. 283
(Sask. K.B.) at 284 and 285 [hereinafter Joyce] where the court, expressing some apparent
dissatisfaction with the rule, says of the husband that he had "openly tossed her out of his life"
and that "the young woman must pay bitterly for a hasty mistake"; Yates v. Davies, [1960]
O.W.N. 201 (H.C.); and Wdton v. Wilton, [1946] O.R. 117 (H.C.). In the context of
immigration, see Re Cannichael, [1942] 3 D.L.R. 519 (B.C.S.C.).
47 R.S.C. 1952, c. 145, s. 3(a).

48 (1960), 31 W.W.R. 41 (Alta S.C.).
49 Ibid at 43.
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In general, then, we can see a tightening of the hold of the
domicile of dependence in the late 1920s and thereafter. Exceptions
to the rule were no longer created in response to the hardships the
rule caused to women who were held to be domiciled in places
totally foreign to them and who were thereby denied access to the
courts. Rather, exception to the rule was allowed only where the
50
rule might operate to the benefit of the woman.
III. CRITICISM AND LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Although the Canadian courts took an approach of passive
deference to the rule of domicile of dependence, remarking only
occasionally on the "unfortunate" consequences the rule had for

married women,51 other courts engaged in more aggressive criticism
of the rule. In Gray v. Fonnosa,52 Lord Denning, speaking of the
"old" doctrine of the unity of husband and wife in the person of the
husband, stated that in large measure the doctrine had been swept
away by Parliament. However, he stated, "one relic which remains
is the rule that a wife takes her husband's domicile; it is the last
barbarous relic of a wife's servitude."53 Notwithstanding his track
record for sweeping away other relics of which he did not approve,
Lord Denning then went on to say: 'Yet sitting in this court we
must observe it."54
Partly as a result of the criticism of the rule and perhaps
partly out of governmental self-interest, legislative reform of the

50 Note that even in the context of immigration, where it was the wife who in fact had
a separate domicile in Canada and the husband remained domiciled in Scotland, the courts
held that the rule applied so as to impute the Scottish domicile to the wife living in Canada.
See Re Carmichael,supra, note 46.

51 See Nelson, supra, note 46 at 525; and see Joyce, supra, note 46 at 285 where Taylor
J.comments upon the harshness of the rule, but ultimately casts the woman as the author of
her own misfortune.
52 (1962), [19631 P. 259 (CA).
53
54

lbid at 267.
Ibid
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rule began to take place.5 5 The first attempt at reform of the rule
in Canada took place in New Brunswick. In 1906, the provincial
legislature passed an amendment to the Property of Maried Women
Ac4 5 6 providing that, where a woman would be entitled to a
protection order as a result of her husband's cruelty, lunacy,
imprisonment, drunkenness, desertion, or where the conduct of her
husband constituted grounds for judicial separation or divorce, the
woman would be deemed to have her own domicile for the purpose
of bringing an action in the New Brunswick courts. In 1927,
57
apparently as a result of the Privy Council decision in Cook,
Alberta also attempted some piecemeal reform of the rule. The
Alberta legislature enacted what is now section 10(b) of the
Domestic Relations Act.58 It provides that, where a judgment of
judicial separation has been granted, the wife is to be treated as a
single woman for all purposes including the acquisition of a new
domicile.
Governmental self-interest also argued in favour of change
of deserted women. Deserted wives who were denied
the
case
in
access to the divorce court could become a threat to the public
purse. In a society where women had few means of gaining
financial security or even subsistence apart from marriage and hence
male financial support,5 9 a woman and her dependent children who
were abandoned by the initial husband and incapable of acquiring a
new one might well have only the resources of the state to fall back

55For further critical discussion of the rule, see McLeod, supra, note 5 at 154 n. 126.
The rule has now been completely abolished in England by section 1(1) of the Domicile and
Matrimonial ProceedingsAct (U.K.), 1973, c. 45. It reads: "[T]he domicile of a married
woman as at any time after the coming into force of this section shall, instead of being the
same as her husband's by virtue only of marriage, be ascertained by reference to the same
factors as in the case of any other individual capable of having an independent domicile."
56

C.S.N.B. 1903, c. 78, s.20, as am. S.N.B. 1906, c. IX. Now Married Women's Property

Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, C. M4, s. 9(2).
57

Supra, note 1.

58 S.A. 1927, c. 5, s. 10(b), as am. R.S.A. 1980, c. D-37, s. 10(b).
59 See C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) at
132; C. Hamilton, Marriage as a Trade (London: Women's Press, 1981) at 27.
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on.6° Perhaps to avoid this contingency, the state was prepared to
grant some exceptions to the rule and allow for the possibility that
a new husband would take over the responsibility of financial
maintenance of the woman and her children.
Of course, the Alberta legislation did not do what it
purported to do. The province has no power over divorce jurisdiction. 61 Thus, in so far as the provision sought to allow a woman
with a judicial separation to petition for a divorce in the courts of
the jurisdiction where she herself was domiciled, it was ultra vires.
The legislation did, however, have the effect of giving a woman with
a judicial separation her own independent domicile for the purposes
of succession to movable property. The legislation might also
operate in the field of jurisdiction in nullity of a voidable marriage.
However, the courts might take the view that the granting of a
judicial separation was an affirmation of the existence of the
marriage and therefore precluded the granting of a decree of
62
nullity.

At the federal level, action was initially taken to address the
narrow case of a deserted wife whose husband had abandoned his
domicile in the jurisdiction where the couple had lived. The Divorce
JurisdictionAct 63 was passed in 1930. It was directed precisely to

60Indeed, it was often the case that married women in particular were placed at a
legal
disadvantage in the labour market on the theory that their income was an improper and unfair
supplement to the income of the primary breadwinner - the husband. See Pateman, ibid. at
139.
61 ConstitutionAcq 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (formerly British North AmericanAcq

1867). Section 91(26) lists the power over marriage and divorce as an area of exclusive
federal jurisdiction.
62 See Hillcox v. Morrow (1986), 3 R.F.L. (3d) 45 (B.C.C.A.).

See also the accom-

panying annotation by B. Ziff at 46.
63 S.C. 1930, c. 15. Section 2 read: "A married woman who either before or after the
passing of this Act has been deserted by and has been living separate and apart from her
husband for a period of two years and upwards and is still living separate and apart from her

husband may, in any one of those provinces of Canada in which there is a court having
jurisdiction to grant a divorce a vinculo matrbnonii, commence in the court of such province
having such jurisdiction proceedings for divorce a vinculo matrimonii praying that her marriage
may be dissolved on any grounds that may entitle her to such divorce according to the law
of such province, and such court shall have jurisdiction to grant such divorce provided that
immediately prior to such desertion the husband of such married woman was domiciled in the
province in which such proceedings are commenced."
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this class of "innocent" unmarriageable women.64 The wife was
allowed a separate domicile only for the purposes of petition for
divorce and only where she had been deserted for two or more
Furthermore, her independent domicile could only be
years.
recognized if it had been that of her husband prior to his desertion.
Thus, as was the case in Cook,65 if the wife was abandoned by her
husband in a jurisdiction in which her husband had never been
domiciled, the legislation was of no help to her. Similarly, the
legislation was of no use in a petition for nullity of a voidable
marriage or succession to movable property, these being provincial
matters.
In 1968, Parliament enacted the Divorce Act 66 which
changed the rules relating to domicile and jurisdiction in divorce
significantly. First, domicile in a particular province was no longer
required to establish jurisdiction in divorce. A Canadian domicile
was sufficient. 67 Second, the Divorce Act provided that, for the
purposes of a petition for divorce,68 the domicile of a married
woman was to be determined "as if she were unmarried and, if she
Thus, the
is a minor, as if she had attained her majority.' '6
provision essentially abolished the domicile of dependence for the
purpose of determining jurisdiction in divorce. The language of the
enactment, however, is troublesome. It seems to impose a fiction
upon the court: the wording suggests that one must pretend that
the woman is unmarried. The conclusion that a married woman, as
a married woman, has her own independent existence is still

See Welsh v. Bagnall, [1944] O.R. 526 (H.C.).

65 Supra, note 1 at 448.
66 S.C. 1967-8, c. 24, s. 6(1).
67 Ibid s. 5(1)(a). This eliminated the problem of having to go to a province other than
the one in which the petitioner was resident in order to obtain a divorce where a Canadian
domicile was established.
68 Note also that it has been argued that the 1968 reform only applied to the petition
for divorce. Therefore, for other purposes covered under the Act, such as corollary relief, the
woman retained the domicile of dependence. See C. Davies, Family Law in Canada, 4th ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1984) at 560 n. 7, citing D. Mendes Da Costa, Swudies in Canadian
Family Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1972) at 923.
69 Supra, note 66 (emphasis added).
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avoided.70 Nevertheless, the practical effect was to allow the woman
to petition for divorce on the basis of her own domicile. It did not
include any of the restrictions in the earlier Divorce JurisdictionAct7 l
relating to desertion or the husband's domicile prior to the
desertion.

In 1978, the Ontario legislature abolished the domicile of
dependence by enacting section 65(3)(c) of the Family Law Reform
Act which provided that "the same rules shall be applied to
determine the domicile of a married woman as for a married man.'" 72
In 1986, that provision was supplemented with section 64 of the
Family Law Act73 which reads:
(1) For all purposes of the law of Ontario, a married person has a legal personality
that is independent, separate and distinct from that of his or her spouse.
(3) The purpose of subsections (1) and (2) is to make the same law apply and
apply equally, to married men and married women and to remove any difference
in it resulting from any common law rule or doctrine.

In Prince Edward Island, legislation substantially identical to section
65 of the Ontario Family Law Reform Act was enacted in 1978. 74
In Manitoba, The Domicile and Habitual Residence Act expressly
abolishes the domicile of dependence of married women:
The common law rules respecting domicile, including, without limiting the generality
of the foregoing, ... (b) the rule of law whereby a75married woman has the domicile
of her husband; are no longer law in Manitoba.

70 This wording is retained by section 22(2) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2d Supp.),
c. 3.
71 Supra, note 63.
72 S.O. 1978, c. 2, s. 65(3)(c), as am. R.S.O. 1980, c. 152, s. 65(3)(c). The name of the
Act was changed to the Dower and MiscellaneousAbolitionAct by section 71(4) of the Family
Law Ac4 S.O. 1986, c. 4.
73 S.O. 1986, c. 4.
74
Family Law Reform Act, S.P.E.I. 1978, c. 6, s. 60(3)(c), as am. R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. F3, s. 54(3)(c).

75 S.M. 1982-83-84, c. 80, s. 3, as am. R.S.M. 1987, c. D-96, s. 3.
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In British Columbia, section 4 of the Family Relations Act 76 may be
interpreted as having abolished the common law rule. The section
reads:
4(1) No woman is under a legal disability in respect to a matter under this Act by
reason only that she is a married or unmarried woman.

Of course, the provision only purports to cover matters within the
purview of the Act and, thus, would not operate in the area of
succession. However, in 1985, a general clean-up of law in force in
British Columbia that was thought to violate the Canadian Charter77
led to the enactment of the Charterof Rights Amendment Act.78 It
included a provision that amended the Law and Equity Act79 by
adding section 55 which is substantially identical to what were then
section 65 of the Ontario Family Law Reform Act 8° and section 60
of the Prince Edward Island Family Law Reform Act.81
Thus, in the provinces of Ontario,8 2 Prince Edward Island,
Manitoba, and British Columbia, the doctrine of the domicile of
dependence of married women has been legislatively abolished for
all matters coming within section 92 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982.83

76 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121, s. 4.
77 For a discussion of the process of legislative reform in Saskatchewan in response to
section 15 of the Charter, see S.M. Shrofel, "Equality Rights and Law Reform in
Saskatchewan: An Assessment of the Charter Compliance Process" (1985-86) 1 CJ.W.L. 108.
78 S.B.C. 1985, c. 68, s. 80.
79 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 224.
80 Supra, note 72.

81 Supra, note 74.
82 See, however, Stuart, supra, note 6.
83 Being Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K), 1982, c.11. Again, the provincial

abolition will not affect any matters coming within the jurisdiction of Parliament.
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IV. LASTING EFFECTS OF THE DOCTRINE
A. The FederalPowers
Within the federal sphere, the notion of domicile is no
longer important. For the purposes of divorce, the concept of
domicile no longer plays a role in the determination of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is now determined by section 3(1) of the Divorce Act,8 4
which requires only that "either spouse has been ordinarily resident
in the province for at least one year immediately preceding the
85
commencement of the proceeding."
There is one area in which the notion of domicile of
dependence could possibly still play a role in Canadian divorce law:
it is in the recognition of a foreign divorce granted on the basis of
the wife's domicile prior to the legislative reform allowing the
Canadian courts to take jurisdiction in such a case.8 6 Section 22(2)
of the Divorce Act3 7 provides that a foreign decree granted after
1968 on the jurisdictional basis of the wife's independent domicile
shall be recognized in Canada. An interesting question here is the
position of the Canadian law where the foreign court took
jurisdiction on the basis of a period of residence of the wife of less
than twelve months and did not enquire into the domicile of the
wife. If the wife were de facto domiciled in the jurisdiction, though
only resident there for a period of 3 months, for example, it is
unclear whether our courts would recognize the foreign decree
granted expressly on the basis of the three month residence. The
general principles of recognition, however, would seem to indicate
that the relevant inquiry is into the factual connection of the

84 Supra, note 66.
85

Thus, the juridical unit of concern is once again the province; however, residence, not

domicile, determines jurisdiction.
86

So in the case of a wife deserted prior to 1930 and in the case of a wife not deserted
prior to 1968. See The Divorce Act, supra, note 66, section 6(2). See also Indyka v. Indyka
(1967), [1969] 1 AC. 33, [1967] 2 All E.R. 689 (H.L.) [hereinafter In4yka]; Bevington v.
Hewiston, (1974) 16 R.F.L 44 (Ont. H.C.); Powell v. Cockburn (1976), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 218.
87

Supra, note 66.
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petitioner to the foreign court
and not the ostensible basis on which
88
the court took jurisdiction.
The only other federal areas in which the concept of
domicile played a role were citizenship and immigration, and there,
again, the concept has been eliminated by statute.8 9 Thus, although
at the federal level the common law of the domicile of dependence
was never completely formally abolished, the concept of domicile
itself has become all but obsolete.
B. The ProvincialPowers
Apart from the exceptions in New Brunswick and Alberta,90
five of the ten provinces retain the common law rule of domicile of
dependence. The range of issues affected by the concept of
domicile in provincial areas of power is broader than it is in the
91
federal realm.
The first area in which the concept of the domicile of
dependence continues to have an effect is that of nullity. The
courts have held that, where a marriage is voidable and not void,
the doctrine kicks in and the woman becomes incapable of acquiring
her own domicile.92 This has practical consequences for an
application for a decree of nullity, since jurisdiction in nullity is still
dependent in part upon domicile.93 Only where the alleged defect
would render the marriage void will the wife be able to petition for
a decree of nullity in a jurisdiction where she has her own

88

Robinson-Scott v. Robinson-Scott, [1957] 3 All E.R. 473 (P.).

89 See Immigration Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, s. 128 and Canadian Citizenship Ac; 1974-

75-76, c. 108, s. 36. Both eliminate even a gender neutral concept of domicile.
90 See supra, notes 56 and 58.
91 7he Constitution Acq 1867, supra, note 61, s. 92.
92 De Reneville, supra, note 6.
93

Salvesen v. AdministratorofAustrian Property, [1927] AC. 641 (H.L). Note, however,

that domicile is not the only basis upon which jurisdiction will be taken in nullity. See, supra,
note 6.
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independent domicile.94 The relevant juridical unit for the purposes
of jurisdiction in nullity is the province. 95 Thus, for the purposes of
obtaining an annulment, the woman who is de facto domiciled and
resident in a different jurisdiction than her husband is in the same
position as the wife attempting to obtain a divorce prior to the
legislative reforms in that area.
Indeed, even in Ontario, where the rule of domicile of
dependence has been abolished, the courts have held that the wife
still takes the husband's domicile where the marriage is voidable. In
1983, five years after the enactment of the Family Law Reform
97
Act,96 the Ontario High Court of Justice held in Stuart v. Stuart
that the court's jurisdiction in an application for a decree of nullity
was dependent upon the husband being domiciled in Ontario and
that the wife's domicile was determined by the common law
doctrine. The Family Law Reform Act was never mentioned in the
decision.98
By contrast, in Davies v. Davies,99 the Alberta Queen's
Bench Division held that a woman who was married in Ontario and
whose husband was still domiciled in Ontario could petition the
Alberta court for a decree of nullity of a voidable marriage on the
basis of her own independent domicile in Alberta. McDonald J.
based his decision on the existence of section 65(3)(c) of the
Ontario Family Law Reform Act, holding that because the woman
was capable of having her own independent domicile under Ontario
law, the Alberta court would take jurisdiction in her case. Thus, we

94See D. v. D., [1973] 3 O.R. 82, 36 D.L.R. (3rd) 17 (H.C.); Re Capon, supra, note 6.
95

D. v. D., ibid.

96

Supra, note 72.

97 Supra, note 6.
98 The accompanying annotation by J. McLeod, ibid. at 105, suggests that perhaps the
court was construing the legislative abolition of the rule as applying only to Ontario domestic
law and not to Ontario rules of conflicts of laws. Given the nature of the judgment, ignorance
or confusion are probably the better explanations. The reasoning in the case did not cause
any injustice in the result, since the petitioner would appear to have also been domiciled in
Ontario as a matter of fact.
99 Supra, note 6.
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can see some extent to which at least some judges
are willing to
100
attempt to avoid the strict application of the rule.
Another area in which the domicile of dependence still
operates is in the recognition of foreign nullity decrees. The courts
will not recognize an annulment of a voidable marriage that was
granted where the foreign court took jurisdiction on the basis of the
wife's independent domicile.1 0 1 There is, however, some Canadian
case law to suggest that the courts will recognize a foreign decree

of nullity where the foreign court took jurisdiction on the basis of
a real and substantial connection.102 This would perhaps, allow a
foothold in arguing that the courts should recognize a foreign decree
of nullity where the court took jurisdiction on the basis of the wife's
independent domicile1 03
A further area in which the domicile of dependence operates
is that of succession to movable property.

100 Again,

04

Intestate succession to

according to general principles of conflict of laws, the proper law upon which

McDonald J. ought to have determined her domicile was the law of the forum which was
Alberta. See supra, note 36.
101 See Re Capon, supra, note 6; Kern v. Kern, [1972] 3 All E.R. 207 (Fain.). There are,
however, other basis of recognition of foreign decrees of nullity. See supra, note 6 and Travers
v. Holley and Holley, [1953] P. 246, [1953] 2 All E.R. 794 (C.A.).
102 Gwyn v. Mellen, [1979] 6 W.W.R. 385 (B.C.C.A.).
103 The real and substantial connection with the jurisdiction in Gwyn v. Mellen was the
fact that the wife was resident there. Tius, a fortiori the domicile of the woman in the
jurisdiction should be seen to be sufficient. However, note that in this case the marriage was
void and not voidable, so that the rule did not come into play. See supra, note 6.
104 It could be argued that matrimonial property is a further area in which domicile of
dependence still effectively operates, or at least, in which the common law choice of law rule
embraces gender discrimination. Alberta, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland
still retain the common law choice of law rules in respect of matrimonial property. The
common law rule is that matrimonial property is governed by the law of the husband's
domicile at the time of the marriage. See Re Egerton's Will and Trus4 Lloyd's Bank Ltd v.
Egerton, [1956-57] Ch. 593, [1956] 2 All E.R. 817. For a further discussion of the choice of
law in issues of matrimonial property, see Castel, supra, note 5 at 314ff. and McLeod, supra,
note 5 at 388-98. Another area of some concern might be the proper law of a contract.
Domicile of the parties is one of the factors looked to in determining the legal system with
which the contract has its most significant connection. See McLeod, supra, note 5 at 485.
However, given that the notion of the proper law of the contract is primarily related to the
intention of the parties and was embraced to avoid the rigidity of a fixed choice of law rule,
it is unlikely that the courts would look to a technical and fictional rule of domicile to
determine the proper law. See Morris, supra, note 5 at 265.
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movables is governed by the domicile of the testatrix at the time of
her death 05 Similarly, capacity to make a will is governed by the
10 6
law of the testatrix's domicile at the time of making of the will.
The intrinsic validity, 07 and effect of the will are governed by the
law of the domicile of the testatrix at her death.1 08 The question of
whether marriage revokes a will is also determined by the law of the
domicile of the testatrix immediately after the marriage.1 9 Of
course, the domicile of a married testatrix, in the provinces referred
to, is the domicile of her husband. In a situation where the wife is
unaware of her husband's domicile, as would possibly be the case in
a situation of desertion, it is impossible for her to have control over
the disposition of her estate since she does not know which body of
law she must refer to in planning her estate. Furthermore, the wife
may find herself subject to estate taxes in the jurisdiction where her
husband is domiciled at the time of her death 10
C. The Symbolic Effect of the Rule
Beyond the practical effect of the rule on women's access to
justice, a further serious difficulty with the continuing existence of
the rule is the symbolic effect that it has in moulding our
understanding of the position of women in our society. The
doctrine must be taught in our law schools as valid and subsisting
law in Canada. It cannot be referred to in passing as an old and

Another area in which the concept of domicile operates is in relation to insurance.
See InsuranceAct, R.SA 1980, c. 1-5, ss 273, 290, 379, and 381; InsuranceAct, R.S.N.B. 1980,
c. 1-12, ss 166, 183, 216, and 218.

105 McLeod, supra, note 5 at 413.
106 1bid at 415.
107 With respect to formal validity, a will is valid if it conforms to the formal

requirements of any one of a number of jurisdictions. lbLd at 419.
108 /1bid at 422. See also Wills Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. W-11, ss 40-42; Wills Act, R.S.N.B.

1973, Q W-9, ss 36-39; Wils Act, R.S.N. 1970, c. 401, as am. S.N. 1975-76, no. 23, ss 23-26;
Wills Act, R.S.N.S., 1989, c. 505, ss 15-16; Wills Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. W-14, ss 36-38.

109 mb. at 426.
110 As was the case in Jaffrey, supra, note 2.
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evil rule that was happily done away with years ago. Rather,
instructors must explain to their students that our law still embraces
and enforces the subordination of women to men in marriage.
Some may take time for criticism. But, at the end of the day,
students walk out of class with notes that read: "Married woman
incapable in law of having her own domicile. Takes her husband's
domicile whether she lives with him or not." We may well ask what
it does to these students' attitudes about gender equality to be told
that the law today views a woman's existence as having been merged
into her husband's in marriage. To what extent does the continued
existence of this kind of doctrine shape the normative views of law
students on the status of women in our society?
The rule is insulting to women. It is an affirmation of the
legal enforcement of the subordination of women and a denial by
the state of the existence of women as fully independent agents.
V. EQUALITY AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
A. Is There a Charter Violation?
It seems obvious that the common law rule denying married
women the legal capacity to have a domicile independent from that
of their husbands is a violation of women's right to equality before
and under the law. We do not even need to resort to more
generous theories of equality which stress the accommodation of
differences H11 to conclude that the common law rule imposes an
inequality and discriminates on the ground of sex. Even the most
formalistic of theories of equality would lead to the conclusion that
a rule which holds that wives and not husbands are legally incapable
of their own separate existence with respect to domicile is a
discriminatory inequality under the law.

III Andrews v. Law Society

of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 169, 59 D.L.R.

(4th) 1 [hereinafter Andrews cited to S.C.R.); N.C. Sheppard, "Recognition of the
Disadvantaging of Women: The Promise of Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia"
(1989) 35 McGill LI. 207.
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Indeed, even if we were to use the "similarly situated" test 1 12

to determine whether an inequality under the law exists here, we
would still have to conclude that the rule contains an impermissible
inequality. One cannot sensibly argue the position that married
women and married men are not similarly situated. To do so, one
would have to argue that sex is the basis of their dissimilarity. The
wording of section 15 of the Charter itself would seem to preclude
such an interpretation in so far as it demands equality without
discrimination on the ground of sex. 11 3 The ground of sex is
disqualified by the section itself as a basis for coming to a
determination that the classes of subjects that the law creates are

not similarly situated. Thus, even on the most narrow definition of
equality, the common law rule creates an inequality under the law.114
The rule is discriminatory in that it treats women less
favourably than men.115 To hold that a woman may not petition for
nullity in her own domicile, but must'travel to the jurisdiction where
her husband is domiciled in order to obtain access to the courts,
when the husband seeking similar relief may always obtain access to
the courts in the jurisdiction in which he is domiciled, is to impose
a burden upon women that is not imposed upon men. To hold that
112 Andrews,ibid at 166.
113 Section 15(1) of the Charterreads: "Every individual is equal before and under the
law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability."
114 Even if one were to make an argument that the discrimination was on the basis of
marital status and not gender, the recent opinions of the Supreme Court would indicate that
this will not be a basis for sheltering discrimination. The sex-plus reasoning adopted by the
American courts would seem to have found favour with the Canadian Courts in Canada
Safeway v. Brooks, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219. Thus, where the discrimination is on the basis of
being female plus being married, the courts will consider it to be discrimination on the basis
of sex. The decision in Bliss v. A.G. Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183, 92 D.L.R. (3d) 417 that
pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination has been overruled. The only theory of
equality which could possibly sustain the provision is that equality is achieved by treating all
members of a class the same way. This reasoning completely nullifies any commitment to
equality and was rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada before the enactment of the
Charter in R v. Drybones (1969), [1970] 2 S.C.R. 282.
115 For a discussion of the meaning of discrimination in section 15, see Andrews, supra,
note 111 at 174. McIntyre J. identifies the imposition of burdens, obligations, or
disadvantages on an individual or group as essential to the concept of discrimination. See also
R v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, (1989) 96 N.R. 115.
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the succession to a woman's movable property is governed, not by
the legal system with which she is most familiar, but by the legal
system with which her husband is most familiar, is to impose a
disadvantage not imposed upon her husband. His affairs are
governed, not by her domicile, but by his own. To hold that a
wife's legal affairs may be governed by a legal system that she has
no way even of ascertaining because she does not know of her
husband's whereabouts is to treat women less favourably. None of
this is controversial.
It seems equally implausible to argue that the rule could
qualify as a demonstrably justifiable limit under section 1.
Nevertheless, the exploration of the argument is interesting in that
it allows us to identify what might be put forward as the "state
interests" or "government objectives" that are advanced by the
rule.11 6
The senses in which the state is interested in the
continuation of the rule provide the key to understanding why the
rule cannot be seen as a neutral framework for the ordering of
1 17
private relationships.
Some courts attempted to justify the rule, in the context of
jurisdiction on divorce, saying that the single domicile rule was
necessary in order to avoid the phenomenon of "limping"
marriages. 118 The reasoning was that, with respect to rules for
jurisdiction and recognition of divorce, the best rule will be one
which allows for only one jurisdiction in which any particular
marriage may be dissolved. As long as we say that the husband's
domicile is the only jurisdiction in which a divorce may be granted,
we avoid the complication of a situation in which, for example, the
husband has no grounds for divorce under the law of the jurisdiction
in which he is domiciled and the wife does have grounds for a
divorce in the jurisdiction in which she is domiciled. Were the
husband to be denied a divorce in his domicile and the wife granted

116 See R v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.LR. (4th) 200.

117 It is ironic that in Dolphin Delivery there was both a decision that there was
insufficient government involvement to bring the situation within the purview of the Charter
and that the government interests advanced by the rule were sufficient to save the rule under
section 1. See supra, note 10 at 588-92.
118

LeMewrier,supra, note 8 at 540-41.
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a divorce in her domicile, the resulting situation would be that the
marriage would be subsisting in one jurisdiction and dissolved in the
other. There would be no way of resolving the question of which
court had superior jurisdiction.
This rationale does not appear to include any inherent sex
discrimination. In other words, the objective identified here is not
discriminatory in and of itself. Indeed, from a purely conceptual
point of view, the difficulties addressed would be as effectively
overcome if the domicile of the married couple were defined as that
of the wife rather than the husband. The key here is that there
should be only one competent jurisdiction. As far as it goes, this
rationale does make sense. Nevertheless, the inequality would
probably not pass a proportionality test since it could be eliminated
by a change in the rules relating to the recognition of foreign
divorces. If each jurisdiction were to recognize a decree of divorce
granted by the courts of the domicile of either party to the
marriage, then it would no longer be a problem that both
jurisdictions could dissolve the marriage. Thus, although the courts
of the husband's domicile would not actually grant a divorce to the
husband, they might nevertheless recognize the jurisdiction of the
courts of the wife's domicile and, therefore, view the marriage as
having been dissolved.
In any event, the argument is moot because the jurisdictional
reforms in the Divorce Act 19 allow for the possibility that the courts
of more than one jurisdiction may be competent to dissolve any
particular marriage. Thus, although this objective might have been
seen to be sufficiently weighty in the past, it is now obsolete. The
legislature has already enacted rules of jurisdictional requirements
which prefer the value of accessibility of divorce to the value of
ensuring against limping marriages.1 20 We must, therefore, look to
other possible government objectives underlying the rule of domicile
of dependence.
119 Supra, note 66.
120 ]bid Section 3(1) provides that the court may take jurisdiction where either the
husband or the wife has been ordinarily resident in the jurisdiction for a period of at least one
year immediately preceding the petition for divorce. The courts will recognize any divorce
that was granted on the basis of a real and substantial connection. See Indyka, supra, note
86.
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As we have seen, another government objective put forward
by the courts is the enforcement of the wife's duty to live with the
husband. The obligation arises out of the wife's duty to submit her
will to her husband's. The objective of ensuring that the wife live
with the husband is one which is part of a broader objective of
subordinating the wife to the husband in marriage.
One might ask what interest the state has in ensuring a
subordinate status for women in marriage. I would argue that the
state's interest is at least two fold. First, the state is acting on
behalf of an empowered male class who benefit as individuals from
a law which disempowers their wives. The rule which incapacitated
women benefited individual men directly. It ensured that their wives
could not obtain matrimonial relief against them if they were to
abandon them and leave for another jurisdiction. This, again, still
applies in the context of nullity. Furthermore, it ensured for
individual men that their wives could not structure their legal affairs
according to a legal system with which the husband was unfamiliar.
More generally, it gave individual men formal legal supremacy in
marriage which could be used to secure emotional and psychological
pre-eminence over their wives.
Second, the state is interested in pursuing the subordination
of women because the state itself is benefitted by the continued
shouldering of the responsibility for child care and domestic work by
a class of unpaid women. Were the financial burden of those tasks
not born by individual women, they would be a problem that would
need to be addressed more directly by the state. If women as a
class were to refuse to accept subordination in marriage and thus
refuse to accept the task of child care and domestic labour, there
would be a vast undertaking that would be left either to individual
men or to the state. Thus, the state has a large stake in creating
legal rules which affirm the right of the husband to the wife's
services and thereby lessen the likelihood of that contingency.
Is the state interest in subordinating women in marriage
sufficient to justify a discriminatory classification under section 1 of
the Charter? I would argue that it is not. Indeed, it is clear that
such a purported justification is discriminatory in itself. It could,
therefore, never legitimately act as the foundation of a section 1
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argument.1 21 The whole purpose of enshrining a commitment to
equality in the Charterwould be defeated if it were possible for the
state to justify unequal treatment on prohibited grounds by reference
to a discriminatory purpose.
For example, were this sort of argument permissible, we
could conceive of a situation in which Canadian constitutional
principles applied in the South African context could justify the
system of apartheid. The unequal treatment of blacks could be
justified on the basis of the state interest in supporting white
supremacy. If an interest in discrimination per se is ever recognized
as a justification for an inequality, then the right to equality becomes
meaningless.1 22 Obviously, life will be better for some members of
a society if others are systematically subordinated. However, the
commitment to equality enshrined in the Charter precludes the
pursuit of this sort of government objective. Thus, the inequality
embodied in the rule of domicile of dependence cannot be justified
as a reasonable limit in a free and democratic society.
B. The Application of the Charter
The decision in Dolphin Delivery 2 3 established that the
Charter does not apply to the common law relating to the
relationships between private individuals. The Court took pains to
avoid the inference that the common law is completely beyond the
purview of the Charter. Thus, in so far as the common law is public
law, it is subject to the provisions
of the Charter. However, in so
124
not.
is
it
law,
private
is
far as it

121 For a discussion of the relationship between section 15 and section 1, see A.
Brudner, "What are Reasonable Limits to Equality Rights?" (1986) 64 Can. B. Rev. 469.
122 For a discussion of the principle that the state has no legitimate interest of its own
beyond furthering the interest of the common good, see J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) at 5.
123 Supra, note 10.
124 On this point, see R v. Spencer, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 278, C.R. (3d) 65.
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Dolphin Delivery has come under a great deal of criticism in
a number of quarters 25 Mr. Justice McIntyre, in a terse and
dismissive judgment, seems quite undaunted by the seriousness and
pervasiveness of the ramifications of the decision. Subsequent
commentators have pointed out the unprincipled nature of the
distinction drawn between private law codified by statute and private
law existing as a matter of common law.126 It seems senseless 127
to
hold that the Charter applies to the former and not to the latter.
It has also been persuasively argued that it is wrong to hold that a
court order is not an act in which the government is involved. 128
Such an order, even if it is given by way of the enforcement of
private law duties, prescribes certain action and imposes penalties
for the failure to comply.129 In making an order, the court invokes
all of the coercive powers of the state.130 Thus, court orders should
come within the purview of the Charter as a result of section 32(1)
which states that the Charter applies to the Parliament and the
government of Canada as well as the provincial legislatures and their
respective governments.
In my view, all of these arguments are sound. They suggest
that Dolphin Delivery is extremely problematic and should be
overruled. However, the case also warrants some analysis at a more
specific level in the context of gender discrimination in the common
125 See supra, note 13. For a critical comment on the public/private distinction prior to
Dolphin Delivery, see D. Gibson, "Distinguishing the Governors from the Governed:

The

Meaning of Government Under Section 32(1) of the Charter" (1983) 13 Man. L.J. 505 and
"The Charter of Rights and th6 Private Sector" (1982) 12 Man. L. 213.
126 See Howse, supra, note 13 at 251-52.

Howse points out that Quebec's codified

system of rules has the arbitrary result that private law is subject to the Charter only in this

one province.
127 See Re Blainey and Ontario Hockey Association (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 728 (Ont.

C.A.) [hereinafter Blainey].
128 Howse, supra, note 13 at 251.
129 P. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 678 and

Hogg, supra, note 13 at 274-76.
130 Hogg, supra, note 13 at 275. Hogg quotes from Shelly v. Kraemer, (1948) 334 U.S.
1 at 19, wherein the United States Supreme Court said that the granting of a court order
invokes the "full panoply of state power" and is therefore subject to the Bill of Rights, U.S.

Const. amend. I-XV.
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law of domicile and more generally the common law of husband and
wife! 31
Here, we encounter some unique problems in the
application and interpretation of the Dolphin Delivery decision.
One might say that, on a proper reading of Dolphin Delivery,
the common law of domicile does not fall within the scope of the
application of the Charter because it is common law which relates
to the relationship between private parties, i.e., husband and wife.
The rule does not define or direct itself to the relationship between
the state and the individual. Rather, it defines the relationship
between two private individuals who have entered into the marital
union as a matter of consent.
However, here we must examine the ideological basis on
which the Dolphin Delivery decision was made. In the decision,
much emphasis was placed on the arguments of Katherine
Swinton. 3 2 Swinton argues that the Charter deals with the
relationship between the state and the individual, placing limits on
the authority of the state over the individual.1 33 Extending the
purview of the Charterto private litigation, then, would broaden the
scope of the application of the Charter to an arena in which it was
never intended to apply and for which it is inappropriate. Thus, a
strong public/private distinction is seen to be inherent in the very
concept of the Charter. To think that the Charteris apt to regulate

131 See Brodsky & Day, supra, note 15 at 91. The authors note a further interesting

point about the public/private distinction and its effects on women's equality. As more
facilities, and the example they give is mental institutions, are privatized and taken out of

government control, the scope of Charter protection for women will be constricted.

For

further discussion of the difficulties of the public/private distinction and the scope of section

15, see J. Freeman, "Justifying Exclusion:

A Feminist Analysis of the Conflict between

Equality and Association Rights" (1988-89) 47 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 269; J. Fudge, 'The Public/

Private Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits to the Use of CharterLitigation to
Further Feminist Struggles" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 485; and H. Lessard, 'The Idea of
the 'Private': A Discussion of State Action Doctrine and Separate Sphere Ideology' (1986)
10 Dalhousie i.J. 107.
132 K.E. Swinton, "Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (ss 30,
31, and 32)" in W.S. Tarnopolsky & G.A. Beaudoin, eds, The CanadianCharterof Rights and
Freedoms: Commentary (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) c. 3.
133

]bid at 44.
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the relationships
between individuals is to fundamentally misconceive
134
its purpose.
To take this a step further and to address the guarantee of
equality in section 15 specifically, it may be argued that the
obligation on government to treat all individuals equally exists
because of the particular position of government. Governments
claim authority over all their subjects and therefore must be neutral
between them.135 Subjects, as between themselves, are not similarly
linked by this relation of authority. Therefore, whereas government
is not entitled to prefer its own, individuals are so entitled since
they owe no prima facie obligation of neutrality to their fellows. It
may be desirable to circumscribe the individual's right to prefer his
or her own through the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation.
But the obligation to treat others equally in private employment or
the provision of services is derived from a set of values quite distinct
from the values which 6inform the constitutional guarantee to
13
equality before the law.
On this view, problems of private individuals acting in ways
that deny their fellows the right to equal treatment without
discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, etc., should not be dealt
with through an application of section 15. That provision is directed
specifically to the obligation of a government to treat each subject
equally arising out of the demand for equal obedience from each
subject. The Charter limits the moral authority of the state and
these limits exist precisely because the state is an authority. Thus,
we can see how the Charter may be understood as the moral terms
and conditions of the relationship of authority between the state and
the individual.

134 Indeed, much of the Chartermay be interpreted as defining a private sphere in which
the government is not entitled to intrude. This is the gist of the reasoning of Madam Justice

Wilson in R v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
135 See R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford:

Basil Blackwell, 1974) at 33.

136 For a discussion of the philosophical and moral justification for anti-discrimination
legislation, see J. Gardner, "Liberals and Unlawful Discrimination" (1989) 9 Oxford J. Leg.
Stud. 1.
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Thus, Mr. Justice McIntyre is in agreement with Professors
McLellan and Elman 137 who argue that it would be improper to

allow the Charter to apply to the private sphere. To do so would
result in the creation of a new tort system, wherein the infringement
of a Charterright would become a new cause of action against other
individuals 38 The spectre of such a development is, indeed,
unsettling and does argue for some kind of public/private distinction
in the application of the Charter 39 Thus, I would concede that it
is, at some level, sensible to limit the application of the Charter to
government action. However, I would argue that the lines, as they
are drawn by McIntyre J., are unprincipled and leave out much

government action that should come within the purview of the
Charter 40
The philosophy underlying Justice McIntyre's position may be
further developed with reference to the law of contract. There, the
public/private distinction is focused on the ideal of respect for
individual autonomy. The reasoning is that voluntary choices of
private parties should not necessarily be made to conform to the
values of the Charter. The common law of contract is conceived of
as a neutral framework within which individuals may create their
own relations 41
137 A. McLellan & B.P. Elman, 'To Whom Does the Charter Apply? Some Recent
Cases on Section 32" (1985-86) 24 Alta. L. Rev. 361.
138 See Dolphin Delivay, supra, note 10 at 597.
139 Indeed, with respect to the legal rights, such as the right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure or the right against self-incrimination, the right as it is
conceived relates specifically to the relationship between the state and the individual. The
reason these rights are seen as being of fundamental importance is that they contain the
power of the state and guard against its becoming a totalitarian regime.
140 Again, two of the main difficulties here are the extent to which the granting of a
court order should be considered to be government action and the extent to which there is
a principled distinction between rules of private law that exist as a result of statute and those
that are judge-made. I will, however, leave these aside and proceed to the specific difficulty
of viewing the common law rules governing the status of husband and wife as law relating to
the relationships between individuals.
141 Dolphin Delivey, supra, note 10 itself dealt with the common law of tort. It was
presumably conceived of as a neutral framework for the protection of legitimate interests from
wrongful interference by others. The difficulty of characterizing the judicial determination of
what counts as legitimate interests and what counts as wrongful interference as neutral is
obvious. See R. Epstein, "A Theory of Strict Liability" (1973) 2 J. Leg. Stud. 151 and R.
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However, whatever our view about the soundness of this
position as it relates to contract law, the reasoning cannot be
applied to the common law rule of domicile of dependence. It is
the substance of the rule fixing the woman's domicile, and not the
action of private individuals, that is the source of the inequality and
the source of the alleged violation of the Charter right. One may
accept the argument that there should be a private realm of
decision-making which is not directly moulded by the values we
enshrine in defining the relationship between the individual and the
state. To do so, however, does not lead to the quite separate
position that legal rules which themselves define and specify the
character of relationships between private individuals should be
beyond the purview of the Charter.
In the case of the domicile of dependence, the law imposes
an inequality on the marital relationship. It goes beyond simply
facilitating private arrangements and becomes actively involved in
mandating the nature of the relationship between husband and wife.
If the law requires that private relationships be unequal on the basis
of sex, then it cannot be maintained that it is merely acting as a
neutral support system for the realization of private ends.1 42 The
fact that the state prescribes the character of the marital relationship
makes the state a third party to the relationship and engages the
state directly in a relationship with each of the private parties
thereto. The state, in granting pre-eminence to men in the marital
relationship, breaches the moral terms and conditions of its authority
by failing to treat all subjects equally.
Thus, the distinction between marriage as a contract and
marriage as a legal status emerges as the basis for the argument
that the legally imposed status of parties to a marriage must conform
to the Charter. This is so because the nature of one's legal status
in marriage is defined as a matter of law and not as a matter of
consent between the parties. Indeed, it is not competent to the
parties to contract out of the rule of domicile of dependence. Even
Posner, "The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law" (1981) 10 J. Leg.
Stud. 187.
142 See Pateman, supra, note 59. She notes at 155 that "feminist writers have stressed
the deficiencies of contract in which the parties cannot set the terms themselves" She states
later at 158 that "no husband can divest himself of the power he obtains through marriage."
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if the husband and wife were in agreement that the rule was
discriminatory and did not want their relationship to be tainted by
a gender biased ordering, they could not avoid this result.143
Although some of the aspects of the relationship may be decided as
between the parties, such as the distribution of property on divorce,
other aspects of the relationship are simply set by the substance of
the law.
None of this is to argue that the marital relationship would,
as a matter of policy, be better if it existed as a purely consensual
contractual order or that it would be generally more egalitarian if
it did. Indeed, there are good arguments to suggest that, if it were
left to individual consensual arrangements, the marital agreement
would continue to be disproportionately more advantageous to the
male partner, since men are generally in stronger negotiating
positions than are women.1 44 It is, however, to show that the
marriage is not part of the private sphere and that the state's
involvement in the marital relationship necessitates the application
of the Charter.
Of course, one may point out that many contracts are now
becoming more matters of status than matters of consensual
ordering.
For example, with reforms to labour law, the
employer/employee relationship has begun to resemble the
relationship between husband and wife. Its terms and conditions are
set by law, rather than left to be agreed to by the parties. Like the
law of husband and wife, the law of employment begins to
circumscribe the scope of the parties choice to areas that could be
described as "with whom and when."1 45 Interestingly, however, the
reforms to labour legislation exist as a result of statutory
modification to the common law. Thus, on the reasoning in Dolphin
Delivery, they would be subject to Charter review. 146 By contrast,
the definition of the status of married women was undertaken by the
courts.

143 Warrender,supra, note 29.
144 Pateman, supra, note 59 at 183.
145 Ibid at 166.
146 See Blainey, supra, note 127.
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This brings us to the question of whether there is any
significant difference between law that is made by the legislatures
and law that is made by the courts.1 4 7 The court, in imposing a
particular status on parties within the context of a private
agreement, cannot maintain that it is not acting as an arm of the
state and without governmental authority. The state sets many of
the terms of the marriage agreement and also sets the conditions
under which that agreement may be dissolved. Whether it acts
through the arm of the legislature or the arm of the courts, its
coercive power is invoked and its determinations are authoritative.
It is difficult to respond to or argue against any argument that the
court, in making legal rules, is not acting as part of the government.
One can hardly imagine what form such an argument would take.
Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982148 states that the
Constitution is the supreme law of Canada and any law inconsistent
therewith is void to the extent of the inconsistency. We then are
faced with a judge-made rule of law that married women must take
the domicile of their husbands because, as married women, they are
incapable of having their own domicile. It would seem quite
inconceivable to argue that the reason that the law is not subject
to Charter review is that there was no government involvement in
such a law. The argument would need to be based on some
theoretical distinction between law emanating from the legislature
and law emanating from the court. The shape of such an argument
eludes me. It seems to have eluded Mr. Justice McIntyre, who
made no attempt to explain such a distinction.
VI. CONCLUSION
The argument that the Charter should not apply in the
private sphere of consensual voluntary ordering of relationships
cannot be sustained in relation to rules which set the terms of
private relationships. Parties do not choose to be viewed as

247 Gibson, supra, note 125; D. Beatty, "Constitutional Conceits: The Coercive Authority
of Courts" (1987) 37 U.T.L.J. 183.

148 Supra, note 83.
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incapable of their own independent existence; rather, that status is
imposed upon them as a matter of law. The only recourse that
parties have to avoid that determination is to reject the legal
institution of marriage altogether. Thus, the law is structured so
that the benefits attached to the status of marriage are contingent
upon the parties' willingness to accept the dominant and subordinate
ordering of men over women imposed by the law.
Because the discrimination is imposed by law and not chosen
by the parties, it must be seen as being subject to the provisions of
the Charter to which all law in this country must conform. In
undertaking to set the terms and conditions of the status of
marriage, the courts concede the existence of a strong state interest
and involvement in the definition of the family relationship. Once
the state exercises its power to further the interests of men over the
interests of women and to subordinate women as a class, it has
acted in a manner which exceeds the moral limits imposed on the
authority of the state by the Charter. It matters not whether that
excess is undertaken by the state through the arm of the legislature
or the state through the arm of the courts. In either case, it is a
direct violation and repudiation of the commitment to honour the
right to equality before and under the law without discrimination on
the ground of sex.
Were the Supreme Court of Canada to come to any other
conclusion, being faced with such a problem, the efficacy of the
Charter to eradicate even the most glaring of inequalities in legal
rules affecting women would be impugned. The cynicism relating to
the usefulness of the Charterwould be heightened in the extreme
and the guarantee embodied in section 15 would be exposed as
disingenuous to the point of being laughable.
Of course, the legislatures which retain the rule of domicile
of dependence are not powerless. They could follow the examples
of the provinces that have enacted reforms abolishing the rule.
Indeed, it is deplorable that they have not already done so.

